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PANEL III: THE LIMITS OF
AUTHORITY
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT OPTIMISM
Jamal Greene*
Thirteenth Amendment optimism is the view that the Thirteenth
Amendment may be used to reach doctrinal outcomes neither specifically
intended by the Amendment's drafters nor obvious to contemporary audiences. In prominent legal scholarship, Thirteenth Amendment optimism has supported constitutional rights to abortion and health care
and constitutionalpowers to prohibit hate speech and domestic violence,
among other things. This Essay examines the practical utility of
Thirteenth Amendment optimism in the face of dim prospects for adaption by courts. The Essay argues that Thirteenth Amendment optimism
is most valuable, both historically and today, as a means of motivating
the politicalprocess to protect affirmative constitutionalrights.
INTRODUCTION

It has been proposed, including in this volume, that the Thirteenth
Amendment may be read to prohibit notjust slavery and involuntary servitude but also racial profiling,1 felony disenfranchisement, 2 hate
speech, 3 child labor,4 child abuse, 5 anti-abortion laws,6 domestic vio* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I thank David Barron, Andrew
Koppelman, Lance Liebman, Alexander Tsesis, Symposium participants, and the staff of
the Columbia Law Review for helpful comments and discussion. Morenike Fajana provided
excellent research assistance.
1. See generally William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17 (2004).
2. See Darrell A.H. Miller, A Thirteenth Amendment Agenda for the Twenty-First
Century: Of Promises, Power, and Precaution, in The Promises of Liberty: The History and
Contemporary Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment 291, 294 (Alexander Tsesis ed.,
2010) [hereinafter Promises of Liberty] (arguing "[u]nder the Thirteenth Amendment
Congress could use its enforcement authority to abrogate [felon disenfranchisement laws]
based on their disparate impact").
3. See Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: KA. V.v.
City of St. Paul, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 124, 126 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Missing
Amendments] (contending hate speech "constitute[s] [a] badge[] of servitude that may
be prohibited under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments"); Alexander Tsesis,
Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 389 (2004) (arguing Congress can
prohibit hate speech under Section 2 of Thirteenth Amendment).
4. See Dina Mishra, Child Labor as Involuntary Servitude: The Failure of Congress to
Legislate Against Child Labor Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in the Early
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10
lence, 7 prostitution, 8 sexual harassment,9 the use of police informants,
12
the
anti-anti-discrimination laws," the denial of health care,
Confederate flag, 1 the use of orcas at SeaWorld,' 4 and even laws permitting physician-assisted suicide. 5 Many of these arguments are conceptually sound. Several are consistent in principle with the received wisdom
regarding the original understanding of Section 2 of the Amendment,
which has been read to empower Congress to eliminate the "badges and
incidents" of slavery. 16 Most are no less reasonable than the proposition,

Twentieth Century, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 59, 66-67 (2010) (suggesting child labor is form of
involuntary servitude prohibited by Thirteenth Amendment).
5. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1992).
6. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480 (1990) [hereinafter Koppelman, Forced Labor].
7. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the
S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 102d Cong. 89 (1991) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor
of Law, N.Y. Univ.) [hereinafter Neuborne] (arguing Congress "should recognize that
there are badges and incidents of the chattel slavery that women were subjected to and
that under article II of the 13th amendment, if Congress wished, it could act"); Marcellene
Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against
Women Act, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1097 (1998).
8. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 Mich.J. Gender & L.
13, 21-26 (1993).
9. See Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28
Colum.J.L. & Soc. Probs. 519 (1995).
10. See Robert L. Misner & John H. Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth
Amendment Analysis, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 713, 716 (1977) (contending use of previously arrested individuals as informants violates Thirteenth Amendment).
11. See David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of 'Jim Crow:" A Thirteenth
Amendment Analysis of Colorado's Amendment 2, 4 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 133,
133 (1994) (suggesting Colorado's constitutional amendment to "bar legislation ... which
afford[s] lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals their civil rights" violates Thirteenth
Amendment).
12. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., Remarks at the
Columbia Law Review Symposium: The Thirteenth Amendment: Meaning, Enforcement,
and Contemporary Implications (Jan. 27, 2012) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
13. See Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom: A
Legal History 137-49 (2004).
14. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Tilikum v. Sea World
Parks & Entm't, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (11-cv-02476-JM-WMC), 2011
WL 5077854, at *1 (alleging keeping orcas at SeaWorld violates Thirteenth Amendment).
15. See Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The
Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having
Disproportionate Impacts on Disfavored Groups, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 774, 885-87 (1998)
(indicating that physician assisted suicide could violate Thirteenth Amendment because of
disproportionate impact on African Americans).
16. Such was the unanimous view of the Supreme Court that decided the Civil Rights
Cases. See 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883) (conceding "Congress has a right to enact all necessary
and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its badges and incidents"); id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declaring "indisputable" that Section 2 permits
Congress to legislate "for the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its badges
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still good law, that the Thirteenth Amendment may be read to prohibit
private housing discrimination. 7 Still, it is nearly self-evident that neither
the current U.S. Supreme Court nor any presently imaginable U.S.
Supreme Court is likely to accept any of the arguments just described.
Indeed, the same is true of virtually any conceivable federal appellate
panel or state supreme court, and so it is quite unlikely that this or any
presently conceivable Supreme Court will be moved even to entertain
these questions. And yet here we are.
This Essay considers the uses of what may be called Thirteenth
Amendment optimism. Thirteenth Amendment optimism consists in arguing that the Amendment prohibits in its own terms, or should be read
by Congress to prohibit, practices that one opposes but that do not in
any obvious way constitute either chattel slavery or involuntary servitude
as those terms are ordinarily understood. It is not essential to Thirteenth
Amendment optimism that the opposed practice be otherwise constitutionally permitted-laws banning abortions are not, for example-but it
is essential that the claim would, at first blush, puzzle both reasonable
contemporary audiences and audiences contemporaneous with the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Constitutional optimism, the broader set of which Thirteenth
Amendment optimism is a subset, is common within our culture and indeed might be necessary to sustain democratic governance over time
amid persistently divergent conceptions of the good. 18 Such optimism is
and incidents"). It is not, however, the unanimous view of scholars. Compare Jacobus
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 171,
203 (1951) (arguing "[t]he Thirteenth Amendment nationalized the right of freedom"),
with David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1131, 1177-78 (2006)
(denying Reconstruction Congress's intent to allow bans on race discrimination under
Thirteenth Amendment). Given that the Civil Rights Cases Court applied this language in
manifestly narrower fashion than the Court that decided Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 441-43 (1968), one must wonder whether the term "badges and incidents" is
polysemous and therefore misleading as precedent. See George A. Rutherglen, The
Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to Enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, in Promises of Liberty, supra note 2, at 163, 164 ("The inherent ambiguity in
this phrase is the key to understanding its role, initially in political thought and then in
constitutional interpretation."). Lawrence Sager attaches significance to the fact thatJones,
unlike the Civil Rights Cases, includes within Congress's remedial power the authority to
target not just the "badges and incidents" but also the "relics" of slavery. See Lawrence G.
Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v.
Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150, 151-56 (2000) (contending Thirteenth Amendment's
empowerment of Congress to target "relics" of slavery provides ground for federal criminalization of violence against women).
17. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (holding Congress's authority to enforce legislation under
Thirteenth Amendment includes "the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property").
18. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust
World 10 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Redemption] ("The possibility that
constitutional government will ultimately be responsive to public mobilization and public
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most prevalent in regard to the Constitution's "ink blots"19 : the Equal
Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Ninth Amendment
most especially. 20 What is odd about Thirteenth Amendment optimism,
its prevalence notwithstanding, is that the Amendment appears to state a
proposition that better approximates a rule than a principle. It refers to
three specific practices-slavery, involuntary servitude, and punishment
for crime-the scopes of which were well understood (indeed, too well
understood) at the time of the Amendment's adoption and which remain well understood today. The proposition that private use of racial
slurs or a state prohibition on abortion qualifies as slavery or may be regulated as such does not merely feel technically incorrect as a matter of
current legal doctrine; it intuitively seems to misunderstand the English
language and the terms of art used within it.
Of course, much Thirteenth Amendment optimism fits within the
best traditions of academic argument-the claims are interesting precisely because and to the degree to which they are counteintuitive, exposing our hunches to the rigors of principle.2 1 It is worth pondering, however, whether Thirteenth Amendment optimism is anything more than
academic. This Symposium convened to discuss the Amendment's contemporary implications within this universe, not an alternate one of our
clever imaginings, but the nonacademic payoff of Thirteenth
Amendment optimism is not obvious. As Andrew Koppelman writes of
his own argument, "if you want to be taken seriously, you had better not
opinion gives ordinary people reason to hope that in time the Constitution can be redeemed."); Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 68 (1983)
(discussing possibility of radical constitutional change emerging from resistance to the
state); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297, 350-51 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in
Contest] ("Active engagement with constitutional questions may well produce fidelity to
constitutional values in ways that passive obedience to the Court's authority cannot."); cf.
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 16 (1999) (explaining courts are "forum for making social decisions in context of disagreement").
19. The term, of course, is Robert Bork's. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1989) (statement of Robert H. Bork) ("[I]fyou
had an amendment that says 'Congress shall make no' and then there is an ink blot and
you cannot read the rest of it... I do not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot if you cannot read it."); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 166 (1990) [hereinafter Bork, Tempting America] ("A provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision that is written in
Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot.").
20. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 33
(1969) (quipping that we "come close to using... the three celebrated prohibitory clauses
in the Fourteenth Amendment," like gin, "for everything"); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
208 (1927) (calling tailoring arguments grounded in Equal Protection Clause "the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments").
21. But see Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem with Novelty in
Constitutional Law, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 921, 926 (2001) (criticizing phenomenon in which
"proposing counterintuitive ideas is the fastest way up the academic ladder").
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make a Thirteenth Amendment argument on behalf of abortion." 22
Koppelman is quite right to suggest that any lawyer advancing such an
argument before an actual court would sacrifice his credibility and would
therefore be making a strategic (though perhaps not sanctionable) error.
There may literally be no person, moreover, who currently believes that
laws proscribing abortion are constitutionally permitted but would
change his mind upon hearing Koppelman's argument. And those who
already believe abortion is constitutionally protected have no obvious
need for Koppelman's intervention. Part I generalizes that observation to
other instances of Thirteenth Amendment optimism: They are almost
uniformly unlikely to persuade a court or anyone who supports the challenged practice, and they are gravy to those who already oppose the practice. If Thirteenth Amendment optimism is indeed unpromising, insuffi23
cient, and unnecessary, then is it worth its weight in law review pages?
This Essay does not attempt a complete answer to that question, but
it offers, in Part II, a qualified reason for optimism about Thirteenth
Amendment optimism. Successful creative uses of the Thirteenth
Amendment in support of progressive arguments demonstrate not that
the Amendment's definition of slavery is limitlessly malleable, but rather
that its broad empowerment of Congress lends constitutional support to
political imagination. Part II focuses in particular on the Progressive-era
"Labor Constitution" discussed in detail in the work of James Gray
Pope.24 By placing affirmative rights within a constitutional register, the
Thirteenth Amendment can arm advocates with a powerful rhetorical
resource. It thereby supplies to progressives what interpretivism has long
supplied to conservatives: a language for arguing that the Constitution
inspires, and perhaps even compels, their political objectives. Thirteenth
Amendment optimism is, in this sense, a potential tool for progressive
political mobilization.
But it is a limited tool, best deployed in legislative rather than judicial advocacy, and best tied to Section 2 of the Amendment rather than
Section 1. Thirteenth Amendment optimism about the self-executing
scope of Section 1 may in some cases have significant epistemic or historical value, but such arguments have no other contemporary relevance

22. Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and
Abortion [hereinafter Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited], in Promises of Liberty, supra
note 2, at 226, 227.
23. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 959,
979 (2004) ("Most... commentators.., not to mention lawyers, judges, and politicians,
dismiss [scholarly Thirteenth Amendment] musings as academic flights of fancy-the
kinds of things only law professors, unconnected to reality, would think worth pursuing.").
24. See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957,
102 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12-25 (2002) [hereinafter Pope, Thirteenth Amendment Versus
Commerce Clause] (discussing pre-New Deal labor movement's use of Thirteenth
Amendment to justify constitutionality of pro-labor legislation).
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and make little strategic sense. Affirmative rights arguments are not well
suited to judicial identification and development, and creative judicial
use of Thirteenth Amendment optimism can have unintended consequences. Part II argues, for example, thatJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the
most celebrated case among Thirteenth Amendment optimists, may have
been a mistake for their cause. 25 Jones did not need the Thirteenth
Amendment to reach its result, it did not generate expansive Thirteenth
Amendment case law, and it squandered an opportunity to build on a
well-developed line of cases repudiating the state action doctrine.
Part III returns, tentatively, to the examples from Part I to suggest
ways in which Thirteenth Amendment arguments may be useful in motivating progressive politics while avoiding some of the costs associated
with addressing creative progressive arguments to judges.

I. FOUR EXAMPLES
The Thirteenth Amendment is fool's gold. Part of its allure is that it
does not mean what it says. Its first section prohibits the existence of
"slavery" and "involuntary servitude," except as a punishment for a crime,
26
"within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
Compulsory military service does not count as involuntary servitude, 2 but
being made to perform a service one has agreed contractually to perform
does count. 28 The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment endows
Congress with "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."2 9
According to the Supreme Court, Congress exceeded this authority when
it tried to ban racial discrimination in public accommodations, 30 a frequent target of criticism during Reconstruction, 31 but it did not exceed
this authority in banning racial discrimination in wholly private real estate transactions, a practice that was rampant in the North during

25. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Jones is, of course, a Section 2 case, but, as Part II explains, it
did not rest on a political infrastructure.
26. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
27. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 367 (1918) (upholding constitutionality
of Selective Draft Law against claim that it violated Thirteenth Amendment).
28. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (finding state statute violated
Thirteenth Amendment because it made failure to perform service contract prima facie
evidence of intent to defraud employer).
29. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.
30. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) ("On the whole we are of opinion,
that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law [banning racial discrimination
in public accommodations] can be found in.. . the Thirteenth... Amendment .. ").
31. See Pamela Brandwein, Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and
the Production of Historical Truth 62-65 (1999) (describing congressional reactions to
social equality); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877,
at 368-72 (1988) (discussing how consideration of outlawing racial discrimination divided
Republican governors and legislators).
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Reconstruction and that was not specifically discussed in the debates over
the relevant statute.32
It has been said, fallaciously it appears,3 3 that the Chinese word for
"crisis" is a compound of "danger" and "opportunity." The danger, which
some would call a crisis, in constitutional text not governing constitutional meaning is that it invites judges to commandeer the Constitution.
But that invitation is also, of course, an opportunity. It is this opportunity
that motivates Thirteenth Amendment optimism. This Part discusses four
examples: Koppelman's abortion argument; Akhil Amar's arguments that
the Thirteenth Amendment applies to child abuse and hate speech; and
Marcellene Hearn's and Burt Neuborne's claims that Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act was valid Thirteenth Amendment legislation. These arguments are useful archetypes in part because the deservedly respected status of their proponents requires that they be taken seriously. 4 (One need not be a fool to fall for fool's gold.) This Part
summarizes the arguments and explains, in brief, why none is doctrinally
promising, likely to persuade opponents of the underlying policy target,
or necessary to convince proponents.
A. Abortion
It is appropriate to begin with Koppelman because the notion that
the most vexing constitutional question of our time may be resolved by
reference to the text of the Thirteenth Amendment is, as Koppelman
recognizes, 35 optimism on steroids. The argument, though, is straightforward. To subject a woman (or her physician) to criminal penalties if she
elects to terminate a pregnancy is to conscript her into bearing a child
and becoming a mother against her will.3 6 Because abortion laws regulate

32. SeeJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 454-73 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (showing legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1866 is at best ambiguous); Gerhard
Casper, Jones v. Mayer. Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89, 104 (explaining "the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] was not explicitly concerned with residential segregation"); Louis Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 84-86 (1968) (discussing difficulties with Court's opinion inJones).
33. See Victor H. Mair, Danger + Opportunity # Crisis: How a Misunderstanding
about Chinese Characters Has Led Many Astray, PInyin.info: A Guide to the Writing of
Mandarin Chinese in Romanization, http://pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last modified Sept. 2009) (hypothesizing causes of common
misunderstanding).
34. Indeed, one federal appellate court has cited Koppelman's argument (in addition to related arguments advanced by Laurence Tribe and Donald Regan) as evidence
that applying the Thirteenth Amendment to abortion rights is not frivolous, on which
basis the district court had awarded attorney's fees to the State of Utah. Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1514, 1515 & n.9 (10th Cir. 1995).
35. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Koppelman's position that
Thirteenth Amendment arguments supporting abortion are seldom taken seriously).
36. Koppelman is far from the first abortion rights proponent to invoke the
Thirteenth Amendment, but his argument is more detailed than most. For other discus-
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women most directly, moreover, they "define women as a servant caste,"
which Koppelman describes as "the same kind of injury that antebellum
slavery inflicted on blacks."3 7 The style of the argument is textualist and,
broadly speaking, originalist and doctrinal. The claim that involuntary
servitude encompasses "the control of the labor and services of one man
for the benefit of another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal
of his own person, property and services"'8 is an appeal to the common
sense meaning of the phrase, is consistent with the original meaning of
the Thirteenth Amendment, and appears verbatim in the United States
Reports.3 9 No Supreme Court decision has applied this language to abortion rights, and there is no reason to believe that any American living in
1865 would have thought it applicable to abortion rights, but neither of
those objections is dispositive within mainstream versions of both
originalism and living constitutionalism.
In a recent book chapter revisiting his original article, Koppelman
invites readers to explain the defect in his argument, which no one has
done to his satisfaction.4 ° But the answer has already been suggested by
John McGinnis. McGinnis writes: "It is not only that no reasonable person at the time would have thought that unwanted pregnancy was a form
of involuntary servitude. Even now such an argument would be treated at
best as a pun on labor rather than seriously advanced in a court of law." 4
Koppelman answers this charge with the familiar objection that specificintent originalism would require the preservation of laws requiring segregated schools and banning miscegenation. 42 The difference is that the
constitutional attack on segregated schools and antimiscegenation laws
proceeds from analysis of the Equal Protection Clause, which does not
lend itself to specific-intent application. We can contrast the Equal
Protection Clause with the congressional age requirement or the presidential oath, which few argue could be replaced by something practically

sions, see Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-10, at 1354 n.113 (2d ed.
1988) (contending "[t]he thirteenth amendment's relevance [to laws requiring a woman
to continue an unwanted pregnancy] is underscored by the historical parallel between the
subjugation of women and the institution of slavery"); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v.
Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1619-20 (1979) (suggesting constitutional argument against
abortion statutes could be based on nonsubordination and physical integrity values of
Thirteenth Amendment). For examples of the use of Thirteenth Amendment arguments
by advocates, see Reva B. Siegel, Roe's Roots: The Women's Rights Claims That
Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1875, 1884 n.34, 1891, 1896 n.98 (2010).
37. Koppelman, Forced Labor, supra note 6, at 485.
38. Id. at 486 (emphases added by Koppelman) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 542 (1896) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
40. Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited, supra note 22, at 235 ("If there is a defect in
[the abortion] argument, no one has ever stated it in print.").
41. John 0. McGinnis, Decentralizing Constitutional Provisions Versus Judicial
Oligarchy: A Reply to Professor Koppelman, 20 Const. Comment. 39, 56 (2003).
42. Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited, supra note 22, at 235.
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equivalent but not contemplated by the founding generation. 43
Koppelman's burden is to show why slavery and involuntary servitude are
more like the Equal Protection Clause and less like the age requirement
or the oath.
Meeting this burden is hardly a conceptual impossibility but it does
not seem true either to original expectations about the words themselves
or, more significantly, to the way we think of the words today.44 The
Supreme Court has spoken to these questions. Thirteenth Amendment
optimists often cite the Slaughter-HouseCases, in which Justice Miller wrote
for the majority that "while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the
Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind
of slavery, now or hereafter."45 This reminder does not speak to the important question of the level of specificity at which we should understand
"slavery," though the Slaughter-House Court was quite clear that the term
was bound up with the practice of chattel slavery. 46 The Court was more
direct in Robertson v. Baldwin, in which it held that the Amendment does
not apply to seamen contracts:
The prohibition of slavery, in the Thirteenth Amendment, is
well known to have been adopted with reference to a state of affairs which had existed in certain States of the Union since the
foundation of the government, while the addition of the words
"involuntary servitude" were said in the Slaughterhouse cases, to
have been intended to cover the system of Mexican peonage
and the Chinese coolie trade, the practical operation of which
might have been a revival of the institution of slavery under a
different and less offensive name. It is clear, however, that the
amendment was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine
with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always
been treated as exceptional, such as military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents47 and guardians to the
custody of their minor children or wards.
This reasoning was formally, if cryptically, extended to the military
draft shortly after the Robertson case. 4 Compulsory military service is not
43. Cf. Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 91, 92-93
(2010) (using presidential oath, which is never in fact read verbatim, as example of way in
which our "expectations" about constitutional practice may supplement or substitute for
text).
44. Jack Balkin has argued that originalism should pay careful attention to the level
of specificity at which a constitutional command was originally understood. See Balkin,
Constitutional Redemption, supra note 18, at 229.
45. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
46. See id. at 71-72 (describing slavery as relationship of "unlimited dominion").
47. 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (internal citations omitted).
48. Justice White wrote for a unanimous Court in the Selective Draft Law Cases,
[W] e are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from
the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to
the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared
by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition
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"involuntary servitude" because, well, it just isn't. As Koppelman notes,
"[t]he bounds of legitimate legal argument are not set by rules but by
custom and usage," 49 and lawyers are unaccustomed to using Section 1 of
the Thirteenth Amendment in the way he proposes.
Koppelman, as noted, is keen to the charge that his argument is a
doctrinal nonstarter. In his book chapter he cites Katherine Taylor's
conclusion that courts are more likely to be sympathetic to an equal protection argument against abortion restrictions than a Thirteenth
Amendment challenge. 50 Koppelman expresses optimism, though, that
the proliferation of Thirteenth Amendment optimism (my term, not his)
may give his argument more doctrinal credibility.-" But Taylor's challenge may be read as more than just skepticism about courts. Arguments
grounded in equality are also more likely both to be adopted by abortion
rights proponents and to be sufficient to persuade them that their position is constitutionally sound.
B. Child Abuse and Hate Speech
In separate Harvard Law Review articles written two decades ago,
Amar made the case that the Thirteenth Amendment does indeed establish a broad antislavery constitutional regime that, accordingly, permits
its language to extend to child abuse and to hate speech." This Essay
considers these arguments together because Amar appears to have conceptualized them contemporaneously. Amar's stature as a constitutional
law scholar derives directly from two features of his scholarship-creativity and historical rigor-that reward attention to his Thirteenth
Amendment arguments. Consistent with his constitutional positivism, his
approach is to offer a conception of "slavery" that constitutes "a working
definition suitable for judges and exemplified (though not necessarily
exhausted) by the peculiar historical practices the Amendment was
plainly meant to abolish."53 For him, chattel slavery serves as the paradigm case, but slavery within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment
is more broadly "[a] power relation of domination, degradation, and
subservience, in which human beings are treated as chattel, not perof involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth
Amendment ....
245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). Unless we understand the Thirteenth Amendment to describe a
term of art, the Court's failure of imagination baffles.
49. Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited, supra note 22, at 238.
50. Id. (citing Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death's Door, 85
Colum.J. Gender & L. 85, 146 n.198 (1997)).
51. See id. (explaining "[a]s Thirteenth Amendment arguments become more familiar, the Thirteenth Amendment case for abortion will become less surprising . . . [and]
[t]he Thirteenth Amendment may again become a part of our constitutional conscience").
52. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3; Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5.
53. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5, at 1365 n.18.
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sons."54 Accordingly, an abused child with no right of exit is analogous to
a slave: "Like an antebellum slave, an abused child is subject to near total
domination and degradation by another person, and is treated more as a
55
possession than as a person."
In the absence of actions a court is prepared to recognize as being
under the color of state law, child abuse is not constitutionally prohibited. The Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, which so held, did not view the negligence of Wisconsin public
officials as rising to the level of state action sufficient to render the state
federally liable for the horrific abuse suffered by Joshua DeShaney at the
hands of his father. 6 The case for finding state action in DeShaney is not
difficult to articulate, and indeed Amar and his coauthor in the child
abuse article make the case themselves: By structuring its family law so as
to prevent Joshua from leaving his father's abusive home, Wisconsin effectively imprisoned him.5 7 One problem with this theory is that it is
limitless, potentially seeing state action underlying virtually every otherwise private transaction, but this is a familiar problem in the law of state
action, considered and occasionally overcome in several cases since
Shelley v. Kraemer.58 The prospect that any court rejecting this theory
would nonetheless feel moved by Amar and Widawsky's Thirteenth
Amendment argument is beyond dim. To imagine such a court is to imagine a judge or set of judges bothered by the slippery slope problem of
finding state action in DeShaney but unbothered by the complexity in applying Amar and Widawsky's theory to ordinary parent-child relationships, 9 domestic labor by minors, numerous instances of common criminal behavior,6 0 apprenticeships, workplace harassment, domestic abuse
among adults, and not an insignificant number of judicial clerkships.
Again, there is no conceptual problem with using slavery as a metaphor
to describe these relationships, but Amar and Widawsky, like Koppelman,

54. Id. at 1365.
55. Id. at 1364.
56. 489 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1989).
57. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5, at 1362.
58. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (finding judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenants in order to enjoin property transfer in violation of Equal Protection Clause); see
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (finding state action in
private civil litigant's racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (finding state action in transfer of park between private
entities under segregation covenant).
59. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (stating Thirteenth
Amendment "was not intended.., to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the
custody of their minor children or wards").
60. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 213 (1995) ("DeShaney's case could just
as readily be analogized to one in which a mugger beats up his victim in the presence of a
police officer who, having been inadequately trained, is unable to prevent the crime.").
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do not make a persuasive case that the Thirteenth Amendment's language was intended to be metaphorical. 61
Amar originally advanced his argument that the Thirteenth
Amendment might be invoked to prohibit certain forms of hate speech
in an article responding to the Court's decision in R.A.V v. City of St.
Paul.6 2 The R.A. V. Court invalidated a municipal ordinance that, as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, banned symbolic "fighting
words" that were based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender. Justice
Scalia's majority opinion held that, with limited exceptions, a government could not engage in content-based regulation even within a category of unprotected speech (like fighting words).63 In a concurring opinion, Justice White objected to the majority's reasoning but said he would
have invalidated the statute as substantially overbroad. 4 For Amar, the
missing piece in all of the opinions in the case was any discussion of the
Reconstruction Amendments, including the Thirteenth. Even if the state
may not generally regulate race-based fighting words, perhaps, Amar argued, it might do so by specifically invoking the Thirteenth Amendment
and its commitment to the eradication of the badges and incidents of
65
slavery.
This provocation makes for scintillating scholarship, and not incidentally, it leaves much room for quibbling.66 Since the concerns of this
Essay are largely external to Amar's argument, it will focus on an aspect
of R.A.V. to which he himself draws the reader's attention: the vote
lineup. Amar notes that three of the four Justices in the minorityJustices White, Blackmun, and Stevens-had voted to uphold race-based
61. See id. at 212 ("[I]t does not follow that every relation that is brutal, degrading,
and dehumanizing is a form of slavery, any more than it follows from the fact that all
judges are wise that all wise men are judges."). In fact, Amar and Widawsky discuss some
historical instances of cross-comparison between the master-slave and the parent-child
relationship. For example, during the congressional debate over passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, several members of Congress drew analogies between these relationships.
See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 5, at 1367 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
215 (1865) (statement of Rep. Chilton White); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941
(1864) (statement of Rep. Fernando Wood); Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1636
(1862) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger)). None of the statements Amar and
Widawsky cite make the case that anyone of consequence believed the Thirteenth
Amendment would in fact cover such parental relationships, and two come from opponents of the Amendment and so do not represent especially reliable evidence of its intended scope.
62. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
63. Id. at 383-84.
64. Id. at 411 (White,J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although I disagree with the
Court's analysis, I do agree with its conclusion .... However, I would decide the case on
overbreadth grounds.").
65. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at 155-60.
66. For a general critique, see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1639, 1647-56 (1993) (rejecting Amar's argument that Thirteenth
Amendment "trumps" First Amendment).
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affirmative action plans,67 while no member of the majority had done
so.6" The concurring Justices also tended to invoke the specifics of the
case before them, 69 which involved white teenagers burning a cross on
the lawn of a black family that had moved into a predominantly white
neighborhood. These facts tend to support Amar's view, with which I
agree: "[T]he [Justice] White Four may simply have more tolerance for
minority-protective laws." 70
Recall, though, that the judgment in R.A. V. was unanimous, and it
was not so for want of a better argument for regulating racist hate
speech. As noted, the concurring Justices believed that the St. Paul ordinance was substantially overbroad, and they were right. The ordinance as
construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court conflated "displays that one
knows or should know will create anger, alarm or resentment based on
racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias" 71 with the "fighting words" recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire2 as unprotected speech. This was
7 3 : As
not a fair reading of the Court's doctrine, especially since Chaplinsky
Justice White wrote, "The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt
feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unpro-

67. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at 147 & n.130. Justice O'Connor's
later vote in favor of the University of Michigan Law School's plan in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), means that all fourJustices who refused to join the majority opinion
in RA.V.have voted to uphold affirmative action plans.
68. This is no longer so, as Justice Souter dissented in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and voted with the
majority in Grutter. RA.V.was decided at the end of Justice Souter's second term, and
there is some evidence that Supreme Court Justices engage in unstable voting patterns
early in their careers. See Lee Epstein, Kevin Quinn, Andrew D. Martin & Jeffrey A. Segal,
On the Perils of Drawing Inferences About Supreme Court Justices from Their First Few
Years of Service, 91 Judicature 168, 169 (2008) (finding "all but 4 of the 26judges ...investigated exhibited statistically significant ideological drift from their initial preferences"). The authors conclude that Souter in particular made a "180-degree turn[] from
the preferences revealed in [his] first few terms." Id. at 177.
69. See Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at 150 (arguing 'justice White...
seemed to be thinking more about the alleged incident before him").
70. Id. at 147.
71. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom. R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
72. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (upholding New Hampshire statute forbidding use of
words tending to "cause a breach of the peace" against constitutional challenge).
73. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (reversing conviction of demonstrator who loudly said "[w]e'll take the fucking street" because his words were not intended
and likely to produce imminent disorder); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971)
(rejecting that wearing jacket that said "Fuck the Draft" in courthouse fell into "those relatively few categories of instances where .. . [the] government [could] deal more comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression"); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (finding fighting words exception did not permit breach of peace conviction simply for speech that "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest").
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tected."74 Reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment, even if otherwise doctrinally viable, would have at best made the ordinance slightly less overthe fact
broad, and indeed might have made it more overbroad in view of
75
words.
fighting
race-based
to
limited
not
was
ordinance
the
that
There is every reason to believe that the concurring Justices would
have voted to uphold a more narrowly drawn statute under standard First
Amendment principles. Justice White's opinion calls the majority opinion "transparently wrong"76 because fighting words are categorically exempt from First Amendment scrutiny: A content-based restriction on
fighting words is no more problematic than a content-based restriction
on assault. 77 Two of the concurring Justices-Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor-voted a decade later to uphold a Virginia statute that
banned cross-burning with intent to intimidate. 78 Although that statute
did not single out race-based intimidation, Justice White's KA. V concurrence suggests that, for Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor, it would
not have changed the result if it had.79
First Amendment doctrine has resources for addressing hate speech
that anyone within the American mainstream is inclined to declare regulable: The speech can be labeled conduct, 80 fighting words, 8 1 or a true
threat, 82 or perhaps could be regulated under the captive audience 83 or

74. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
75. Amar appears to recognize this problem: In a footnote, he drafts a "more defensible" ordinance that is tied much more specifically to the Thirteenth Amendment. See
Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at 160 n.187. Amar's proposed legislation includes "gender subordination" as a "badge of slavery," but he seems to view it as a close
question. See id. (noting narrower version of proposed legislation that only targets racial
subordination is "easier to fit into standard Thirteenth Amendment doctrine" than version
that also targets gender subordination).
76. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 398 (White, J., concurring).
77. See id. at 400-01; cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (upholding state statute that "singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm").
78. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003).
79. Justice Stevens said so expressly in Black. See id. at 368 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring specifically to his and Justice White's separate opinions in RA. V.that concluded
intent to intimidate "unquestionably qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by
the First Amendment").
80. See id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding "whatever expressive value
cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only intimidating conduct"); Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (upholding state statute because it was "aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment").
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (concluding fighting
words are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas").
82. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (concluding in order not to
violate First Amendment, government must prove "true threat" under federal statute prohibiting threats against President).
83. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2295,
2312 (1999) (analyzing captive audience doctrine in workplace context and arguing doc-
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secondary effects doctrines. 84 Advocates, including Amar,85 have suggested that the imperatives of the Fourteenth Amendment might justify
regulation of hate speech notwithstanding the First Amendment's protections for expressive activity. 86 That the Court has tended not to find
these avenues compelling is not for want of clever argumentation. Those
inclined to uphold hate speech regulation will be happy to use the existing tools. Those inclined not to do so are unlikely to accept Amar's invitation to craft a new doctrine based on a nineteenth-century constitutional amendment addressed most evidently to state-enforced ownership
of human beings.
C. The Violence Against Women Act
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provided a federal civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. 7 The Supreme Court
invalidated this provision of VAWA in United States v. Mortison on the
grounds that it exceeded the power of Congress under either the
Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.88 The
Court held that VAWA's civil enforcement provision was not valid
Commerce Clause legislation because it regulated noneconomic activ-

trine "should regulate particular situationswhere people are particularly subject to unjust
and intolerable harassment and coercion").
84. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (concluding city's "asserted interest in combating the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments . . . is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic messages conveyed by nude dancing" and therefore turning to other factors to determine ordinance
was content neutral); Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (upholding
city ordinance tailored to affect "only that category of theaters shown to produce ... unwanted secondary effects"); Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599, 60608 (Ct. App. 1996) (adopting secondary effects rationale to reject First Amendment challenge to injunction against workplace racial harassment), affd on other grounds, 980 P.2d
846 (Cal. 1999).
85. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at 151-55 (explaining how Justices
could have integrated Reconstruction Amendments into their opinions in RA.V).
86. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 193 (1993)
(explaining "[t]he Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments fundamentally
altered the Constitution by placing equality.., in the forefront of constitutional concern"
and therefore hate speech is "without First Amendment protection"); Thomas C. Grey,
Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 63J. Higher
Educ. 485, 485 (1992) (exploring conflict of civil rights and civil liberties in context of
discriminatory verbal harassment on college campuses); Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment,
37 Vill. L. Rev. 787, 792 (1992) ("When hate speech is employed with the purpose and
effect of mantaining established systems of caste and subordination, it violates [the] core
value [of full and equal citizenship expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause].").
87. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322 tit. IV, §
40302(c), 108 Star. 1902, 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)).
88. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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ity,89 and that it was not valid Section 5 legislation because it targeted private rather than state action. 90 Marcellene Hearn and Burt Neuborne
separately have argued that the Thirteenth Amendment, which has no
state action trigger, could have supplied the missing jurisdictional
hook.9" Specifically, and consistent with Amar's argument as to child
abuse, Congress could regard domestic violence as a badge or incident of
92
a power relationship akin to that of master and slave.
Hearn's argument is both textualist and originalist. 93 She argues,
first, that domestic violence, rape, and sexual assault constitute involuntary servitude, and second, that violence against women is a badge and
incident of nineteenth-century coverture. 94 Common law coverture rules
still in effect at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment subjected married women to domination and control by their husbands, and violence
within marriage was typically both legal and expected.95 This connection
was not lost on opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment, some of whom
suggested concern (feigned, perhaps) that the proposed amendment
might alter the marital relationship.9 6 Neuborne's argument, which he
89. Id. at 618.
90. Id. at 626-27.
91. See Neuborne, supra note 7, at 89 ("[T]here are badges and incidents of the
chattel slavery that women were subjected to and that under article II of the 13th amendment, if Congress wished, it could act [to prohibit it]."); Hearn, supra note 7, at 1098
("Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is an alternative source of Congress's power to
create a cause of action for private discrimination.").
92. See Hearn, supra note 7, at 1145 (arguing 'just as Congress can enact legislation
that addresses other badges and incidents of nineteenth-century slavery, it has the power
to enact the VAWA"); see also Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women,
Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 Yale J.L. & Feminism 207, 20910 (1992) (arguing battered women are subjected to form of involuntary servitude cognizable under Thirteenth Amendment).
93. See Hearn, supra note 7, at 1141-43 (focusing on text and history of Thirteenth
Amendment and applying it to women).
94. Id. at 1144. Hearn also argues that modern violence against black women is a
badge or incident of nineteenth-century chattel slavery. Id. at 1143 ("Black women may
invoke the civil rights statutes based on the Thirteenth Amendment for claims of racial
discrimination."); cf. KimberlM Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 139-40 (arguing antidiscrimination law obscures interaction between race and sex discrimination for black women).
95. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 456 (1868) (affirming acquittal of
husband in unprovoked whipping of his wife, on grounds that state government is subordinate to "family government"); see also Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, Rule of
Love] (demonstrating in detail ways in which repudiation of chastisement regime preserved sexual status hierarchies within families).
96. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. Chilton
White) ("A husband has a right of property in the service of his wife; he has the fight to
the management of his household affairs.... All these rights rest upon the same basis as a
man's right of property in the service of slaves."); cf. id. at 242 (statement of Rep. Samuel
Cox) ("Should we amend the Constitution so as to change the relation of parent and

2012]

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT OPTIMISM

1749

offered in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the
drafting of VAWA, is less specific but equally bold: "To the extent pervasive gender-based violence is denying women an equal status in society, it
is precisely analogous to the badges and incidents of Afro-American slavery swept away by Congress and the courts in the cases following Jones v.
97
Mayer."
These arguments are subject to prudential objections not unlike the
objections to Amar and Widawsky's child abuse argument, though here
they may be even more formidable. Certainly the psychological coercion
that keeps women in abusive relationships may contribute to a form of
involuntary servitude, and rape is, paradigmatically, the violent exploitation of a power relationship; the woman is quite literally enslaved by her
attacker. Moreover, the connection between common law rules that
permitted husbands to inflict corporal punishment upon their wives and
more modem lapses in prosecution of domestic violence is demonstrable.9 8 But once we relax or reconceptualize the constraint that slavery or
involuntary servitude must involve physical coercion and a captive audience, or take literally the absence of a state action requirement-such
that the presence of applicable state criminal laws is not relevant to
whether the challenged conduct is unconstitutional-the Thirteenth
Amendment becomes at least as generative as the Fourteenth. For a
judge in search of limiting principles, the Thirteenth Amendment is a
distraction rather than a solution.
As in DeShaney, the state action to which VAWA is responsive is obvious to anyone looking for it.99 As ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Morrison recognizes, the Congress that enacted VAWA compiled a
"voluminous" record tending to show that gender-related stereotypes
held by administrators of state criminal justice systems "often result in
insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime,
inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that
crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually
convicted of gender-motivated violence."' 0 The Morrison majority backgrounds these findings, holding that the federal civil remedy is nonre-

child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, the laws of inheritance, the laws of legitimacy?").
97. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 102; see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
438, 441 (1968) (holding "Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and renting property because of their
race or color" since those conditions constitute "badges and incidents of slavery").
98. See generally Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 95, at 2119 (calling "change in the
rules and rhetoric of a status regime 'preservation through transformation"').
99. This is quite apart from the equally obvious relationship between gender-motivated violence and the interstate labor market, which is subject to federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause. The extensive evidence Congress compiled to this effect is summarized in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-34 (2000) (Souter,J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 620 (majority opinion).
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sponsive because it does not call any state officials to account,'0 1 but the
logic that compels this conclusion is obscure.10 2 Imagine if a state
discriminatorily refused to provide police protection to a predominantly
black neighborhood. (That is, imagine if a state quite literally denied
equal protection of the laws.) Would it exceed Congress's Section 5 authority to authorize federal police to secure the area? One might criticize
the remedy in VAWA as overbroad, but it is difficult to understand the
objection that it is not concerned with state action. Anyone rejecting this
view is even less likely to extend the Thirteenth Amendment to the entire
field of gender-motivated violence.
The contrapositive, logically, is also true. Anyone who accepts the
Thirteenth Amendment argument would have no trouble accepting the
Fourteenth Amendment argument. This is why Neuborne, in his testimony, listed four independent bases for upholding VAWA: in order, the
Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the Thirteenth Amendment.0 3
Although one cannot be sure, these appear to be listed in order of plausibility. 10 4 Likewise, Lawrence Sager has argued that the principle ofJones,
which permits Congress to address the legacy of slavery, applies equally
to VAWA and the legacy of sex discrimination via the Fourteenth
Amendment, unless Jones has been tacitly overruled by City of Boerne v.
Flores"°5 : "Like slavery, [the] long history of state-sponsored disablement
and injustice [against women] has left behind harms that are enduring,
pervasive, and tentacular. In this respect, the reasoning of Jones is fully
apt to [Morrison].""' One could, in other words, make all of Hearn's and
Neuborne's arguments but ground them in the more firmly established
jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The claims discussed in this Part follow a similar pattern. Each proposes a conceptually available but doctrinally foreign application of the
Thirteenth Amendment to a problem more commonly discussed under
the rubric of other constitutional provisions, particularly the Fourteenth
Amendment. Each grounds its argument in a broad-based form of textualism or originalism. None is likely to persuade anyone who finds the
present rubrics unavailing and none is likely to be adopted by the
Supreme Court in the foreseeable future. Should the political environment arise to mainstream a Thirteenth Amendment argument against
abortion restrictions, child abuse, hate speech, or violence against
101. Id. at 626.
102. Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning why Congress could not provide
remedy against private actors if legislation is remedial).
103. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 87-89.
104. Neuborne testified that the Commerce Clause was the easiest ground for decision. Id. at 88.
105. 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1995) (limiting reach of Congress's Section 5 power to remedies congruent and proportional to identified violation).
106. Sager, supra note 16, at 153.
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women, that environment is equally or more likely to support a
Fourteenth Amendment argument or, as likely, to obviate the need for
constitutional argument altogether.
II. SOME OPTIMISM ABOUT

OPTIMISM

The legal academy has become something of a whipping boy of
late. 1 7 This Essay does not endorse the view, stated or implied in high
profile attacks on legal education, that legal scholarship is without value
unless it helps a judge resolve cases. I assume, and strongly believe, that
good academic scholarship, including legal academic scholarship, has
intrinsic worth. The arguments of Thirteenth Amendment optimists have
vastly improved my understanding of the history leading up to the Thirteenth Amendment, of the court decisions interpreting that Amendment
and the political episodes that generated those decisions, of the conceptual bounds of the culturally significant institution of slavery, and of the
treatment of women within marital relationships both before and after
the abolition of rules of coverture. Epistemic value is as good as any, and
it would be ironic if the pursuit of truth, recognized time and again as a
fundamental constitutional value,10 were deemed worthless unless further instrumental to judicial doctrine. Encouraging scholars to advance
colorable arguments about the text and history of the Thirteenth
Amendment not only enriches our collective knowledge but also lends
substance to vital modes of constitutional argument. The practice of constitutional law is no less than the practice of advancing arguments from

107. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2011, at BU1
(criticizing law schools because while "[j]ob openings for lawyers have plunged ... law
schools are not dialing back enrollment"); David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 2011, at BU1 (characterizing law schools as businesses that are not
delivering on their promises); David Segal, What They Don't Teach Law Students:
Lawyering, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2011, at 1 (arguing "[I]aw schools have long emphasized
the theoretical over the useful"); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1992) (arguing law schools "have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the
expense of practical scholarship"). See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools
ix-xiii (2012) (diagnosing numerous pathologies of modern legal education).
108. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth .... "); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining fighting words have "such slight social value as a step to truth"); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining Founders "believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible
to the discovery and spread of political truth"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining theory of "our Constitution" is "that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market"); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.").
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text and history. There is nothing "wrong" with Thirteenth Amendment
optimism; indeed, there is much to commend it.
This Symposium's charge, however, is to discuss the "contemporary
implications" of the Thirteenth Amendment, and so this Essay judges
Thirteenth Amendment optimism through a more discerning lens. This
Essay takes the Amendment's implications to be measured by its impact
on legal doctrine, legal practice, or constitutional politics. Part I suggested that the prospects for influencing legal doctrine or practice are
bleak, but the argument is incomplete. Constitutional law can move
slowly in our common law system. 10 9 Many mainstream constitutional arguments were off the wall before they were on it, 110 and in the case of the
Thirteenth Amendment many arguments were on the wall before they
were off it.
This is easier to see when we look for constitutional meaning outside
the courts and within the nomoi of political and social movements.'
That inquiry demonstrates that Thirteenth Amendment optimism signifies not new but renewed interest in and attention to the Amendment.
James Gray Pope has shown, for example, that the Thirteenth
Amendment was a standard tool of pre-New Deal era unionist advocacy
in favor of congressional legislation to protect labor rights and against
Lochner-era economic substantive due process jurisprudence. 112 For these
advocates, the Thirteenth Amendment proved that labor rights were not
mere "class legislation," but were constitutionally inspired.11 The
Thirteenth Amendment has also been a prominent location for
Executive Branch constitutionalism. Risa Goluboff has chronicled the
ways in which lawyers in the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
invoked the Thirteenth Amendment in an expanding set of cases in the
1940s, beginning with traditional peonage but broadening to encompass

109. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 877, 888 (1996) (acknowledging common law's resistance to change).
110. In 1991 Warren Burger called the argument for grounding opposition to gun
control in the Second Amendment "one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word
'fraud,' on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime," MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16,
1991), and in 1989 Robert Bork said all state gun-control laws were "probably constitutional," see Claudia Luther, Lectures at UCI With Rose Bird: Bork Says State Gun Laws
Constitutional, L.A. Times (Mar. 15, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-15/local/
me-587_1_state-gun-laws-constitutional
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Cf.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding Second Amendment
is fully applicable to states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding Second Amendment confers individual right to keep and bear arms).
111. The term nomoi is borrowed from Robert Cover. See Cover, supra note 18, at 4
(defining nomos as "normative universe").
112. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment Versus Commerce Clause, supra note 24, at
18-22 (discussing arguments made in both contexts).
113. Id. at 22-25 (discussing unionists' belief that "differential treatment of capital
and labor was constitutionally compelled').
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other forms of economic coercion. 114 One must not be too quick, then,
to universalize the contingent background assumptions of modern constitutional practice. As Larry Kramer writes, "Work like Pope's and
[William] Forbath's suggests that taking popular constitutionalism seritendency to perceive
ously might help to counter an otherwise unnoticed
15
the Constitution and its possibilities myopically.""
It is also too quick, however, to assume that a once fecund but now
dormant source of law will bloom again solely because of academic interest, and there are costs in making the effort. One significant difference
between the 1930s and 1940s and today is the advent of modem civil
rights law."1 6 Thirteenth Amendment optimism was a rather different
project when segregation was legal; when the Bill of Rights remained
largely unincorporated against the states; when the state action doctrine
had not been tamed by Shelley, Katzenbach v. McClung,117 Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States,"18 and their progeny; and when, more generally,
"understandings of civil rights [were] up for grabs." 119 The doctrinal resources to achieve Thirteenth Amendment optimism's ends have already
been mined. The obstacle to realization of those ends is less a failure of
constitutional imagination than a failure of constitutional politics.
Some of the costs are well documented. There is, for example, a
credibility cost. Arguments that fail to respect the bounds of conventional usage of language and history risk the charge of constitutional perfectionism.' 0 When Henry Monaghan coined that phrase in his critique
114. See Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil
Rights, 50 Duke L.J. 1609, 1647-68 (2001).
115. Kramer, supra note 23, at 980. Koppelman writes,
At the time the [abortion] article was written, not much had been done with the
Thirteenth Amendment by anyone in the legal academy. It had been a potent
source of law as recently as the 1970s, but it had since gone out of fashion, and
arguments that tried to invoke it as a major premise tended to be ruled out of
order without a hearing, simply because that kind of thing is not done.... [But]
[t]here is an increasing appreciation that the Thirteenth Amendment has potent current applications.
Koppelman, Forced Labor Revisited, supra note 22, at 238.
116. See Goluboff, supra note 114, at 1612 ("[D]uring World War I1and the years
that followed ... 'civil rights' did not refer to a unified, coherent category; the content of
the term was open, changing, and contradictory, carrying resonances of the past as well as
of several possible contending futures.").
117. 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurant near interstate highway).
118. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as applied to Georgia hotel).
119. Goluboff, supra note 114, at 1613.
120. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 358
(1981) (arguing substantive due process proponents believe "the constitution is essentially
perfect" in aligning its guarantees of equality and personal autonomy with those "which
the commentators think a twentieth century Western liberal democratic government
ought to guarantee to its citizens"). Kozinski and Volokh have also argued,
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of substantive due process, he did so in defense of positivism,12' but arguments from text and history are hardly immune to charges of perfectionism. 22 There are also several different kinds of opportunity costs. First,
constructing doctrinal architecture takes time and briefing space at the
expense of firming up the doctrine already in place. Second, devoting
resources to manipulation of judicial doctrine distracts the mind from
the project of altering the political conditions that will ultimately be
needed for that doctrine to be adopted and to crystallize into lasting
precedent. It may be that what Robin West calls "adjudicative law" is existentially destined to greet the kinds of generative claims advanced by
Thirteenth Amendment optimists with skepticism. 123 West writes,
[P] rogressives understand constitutional law as possibilistic and
open-ended, as change rather than regularity and as freedom
rather than constraint. This understanding of constitutionalism
may be right, and it may even be right as an account of law, but
as an account of adjudicativelaw-of what courts in fact do-it is
perverse. Adjudicative law is persistently authoritarian: demonstration of the "truth" of legal propositions (arguably unlike
other truth statements) relentlessly requires shows of positive

Following the lengthening shadows of constitutional provisions as they recede
ever further from the source is something to be undertaken cautiously, with a
constant regard to the consequences. No matter how tempting or righteous the
desired result may be, one must always be ready to recognize when the reading
has become too tenuous, the proposed doctrine too vague, the implications too
risky.
Kozinski & Volokh, supra note 66, at 1657.
121. Monaghan, supra note 120, at 396 ("To be sure, the constitution embodies an
ideology, but it is a limited one.").
122. The virtual cottage industry in originalist defenses of Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), provides the most obvious example. See Bork, Tempting America,
supra note 19, at 76 (explaining "the result in Brown is consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause"); John Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
13 Const. Comment. 243, 243-44 (1996) (arguing if Fourteenth Amendment "does indeed
yield some kind of ban on race discrimination, its text is most plausibly read as a ban on all
such distinctions, with no exception for symmetrical discrimination"); Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1140 (1995)
(showing "school segregation was understood during Reconstruction to violate the principles of equality of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Originalist Steven Calabresi has a long
history of refusing to bite the bullet on unattractive constitutional outcomes. See Steven G.
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 101
(2011) ("The original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, when read in light
of the Nineteenth Amendment, renders sex discrimination as to civil rights unconstitutional."); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 635, 655 n.138 (2006) (asserting Brown was correct from
originalist perspective); id. at 656 (arguing that originalism can explain Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
123. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
641, 714 (1989) (describing "adjudicative law" as "something that courts enforce as law
against unwilling parties").
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authority.... The lesson from this tension between the possibilistic Constitution envisioned by progressives and the authoritarian structure of adjudicative law is not necessarily that the conventional account of adjudicative law as requiring demonstrations of binding authority is wrong; rather, the important point
may be that the identification of constitutional process and
choices with the sphere of adjudicative rather than24legislative
legality-with law rather than politics-is misguided. 1
Thirteenth Amendment optimism, like progressive constitutionalism
more generally, is aspirational. It seeks to broaden extant understandings
of constitutional text to permit it to respond to constitutional problems
not specifically contemplated by its drafters and misunderstood within
modern discourse. This project may be well suited to constitutionalism of
limitaa sort, but it is not well suited to judicial practice because it turns
25
legislatures.
of
stuff
license-the
courts-into
of
stuff
tion-the
All is not lost, however, or so this Essay will argue. The redemptive
orientation of Thirteenth Amendment optimism may in fact offer the key
to its contemporary relevance. The two provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment have, without explanation, been treated differently by the
Supreme Court. Section 1 has never been interpreted to prohibit, of its

124. Id.
125. These observations point up a broader issue worthy of attention in future work.
The conclusion that Thirteenth Amendment optimism entails conceptually plausible but
nonetheless off-the-wall arguments is not simply a judgment about political viability;
Thirteenth Amendment optimism also frequently violates what we might call second-order
conditions for constitutional legitimacy. First-order conditions specify the form a constitutional argument must take in order to count as such. A claim about constitutional meaning that does not proceed from historical understanding, constitutional text or structure,
precedent, prudential or policy argument, perhaps ethical argument or natural law, or
some combination of these may be perfectly persuasive within some domain, but does not
likely count as constitutional argument and would not be understood as such by most constitutional lawyers. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 3-119 (1982) (exploring
these arguments); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1189-90, 1194-209 (1987) (explaining "the relevance of at least five kinds of arguments" in constitutional debate). Less
explored are the limitations particular to a given style of constitutional claim. It may be
that constitutional argument need not only conform to a recognized first-order modality
but must also attend to the relationship between form and function. Certain doctrinal
claims may simply fail to "fit" with certain modalities. Thus, arguments that emphasize the
generativity of language may not be compatible with originalism, which (by convention)
seeks above all to constrain. See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71
Md. L. Rev. 978, 981 (2012) (arguing originalism "binds interpretation to a fixed and
knowable set of meanings, so as to impede the indeterminacy and opportunity associated
with open-textured constitutional construction"). But see Jack M. Balkin, Living
Originalism (2011) (defending dynamic, generative version of originalism). Because they
must, at best, inspire politics, Thirteenth Amendment arguments must concede, indeed
celebrate, the open-ended nature of the constitutional mandates they describe. Section 1,
and especially originalist claims about Section 1, resist such concessions.
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own accord, "badges and incidents" of slavery, 1 2 6 but Section 2 has been
said to empower Congress to eradicate such badges and incidents almost
from the beginning of Thirteenth Amendment interpretation. Some
Thirteenth Amendment optimists understandably find this disjunction
troubling,' 27 but separating the two sections permits us to identify the
Amendment with two overlapping but distinct forms of constitutionalism:
judicial and legislative. As West suggests, legislative constitutionalism is
less authoritarian than judicial constitutionalism and therefore more
compatible with progressive constitutional arguments. 2 It also does not
suffer from the same opportunity costs because Thirteenth Amendmentinspired legislation does not require a Thirteenth Amendment judicial
justification. Expanding the political imagination by way of Thirteenth
Amendment optimism may help, in small ways, to motivate the political
process necessary to craft legislation ultimately grounded in other substantive provisions.
Two examples will help to clarify the argument. First, recall Pope's
discussion of unionist arguments in favor of a Thirteenth Amendment
ground for Progressive-era labor rights legislation."2 Those arguments
did not succeed in their particulars but they were vital to the legislation
that eventually passed. The anti-injunction bill that eventually became
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was drafted by the labor reformer Andrew
Furuseth, who specifically invoked the Thirteenth Amendment-inspired
notion that management cannot have a property right in the labor of its
workers. 130 Furuseth likewise urged Senator Robert Wagner to base the
1 31
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on the Thirteenth Amendment,
and in defending the legislation, Wagner drew on principles the labor
movement had long tied to that provision, namely the right to freedom
from economic as well as physical coercion. 13 2 Other proponents of the
126. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128-29 (1981) (reserving judgment on scope of Section 1); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968)
(same).
127. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1311, 1314-16 (2007)
(arguing that Court's refusal to say whether "badges and incidents" formulation applies to
Section 1 has sown confusion).
128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining progressive understanding of constitutional law).
129. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing unions' use of
Amendment in fighting for legislation before New Deal era).
130. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment Versus Commerce Clause, supra note 24, at
34-35 (explaining "bill implemented the Thirteenth Amendment's principle that labor
power could not be property").
131. Id. at 47 (noting Furuseth "wrote Robert Wagner a twelve page letter in which
he urged Wagner to ground his labor disputes bill on Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment").
132. See id. at 48 (noting Wagner's argument that "government enforcement of the
right to organize would bestow upon workers emancipation from economic slavery" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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bill spoke in similar terms. 133 Labor advocates addressed their Thirteenth
Amendment claims to Congress rather than the Court out of distrust of
lawyers13 4 and, importantly, as Forbath notes, because they firmly believed that social and economic rights, though constitutionally grounded,
"did not lend themselves to judicial enforcement."'3 5
Congress eventually justified both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
NLRA on non-rights-based constitutional provisions, namely the power to
control federal jurisdiction and the interstate commerce power." '6 It did
so in response to political pressure, both from pragmatist Progressive
elites like Felix Frankfurter' 37 and from antiunion Southern interests that
controlled vital congressional vetogates but formed part of the New Deal
coalition.' 38 But the text and history of the Thirteenth Amendment became, in Reva Siegel's words, "the site of understandings and practices
that authorize, encourage, and empower ordinary citizens to make claims
on the Constitution's meaning. "139
The second example is more familiar to most constitutional lawyers,
since on its face it represents the most spectacular success of Thirteenth
Amendment optimism. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which prohibits racial discrimination in the
transfer of property, applied to private residential housing discrimination
and, so applied, was valid Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 legislation. 4 °
The Thirteenth Amendment holding in Jones was genuinely shocking but
the result was expected. The state action doctrine, undermined in
Shelley, 14 ' had since been dealt a series of blows so severe that it was liable
to collapse at the slightest tremor. In Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung,
the Court had permitted Congress to evade state-action-based limitations

133. See id. at 48 & n.227 (mentioning and quoting language of bill proponents who
"spoke in terms of slavery, freedom, and inherent rights").
134. See id. at 32-34 (noting "Furuseth and his allies counted more on Congress
than on the courts to move constitutional interpretation forward").
135. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165, 179
(2001).
136. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment Versus Commerce Clause, supra note 24, at
45-46, 49.
137. See Forbath, supra note 135, at 190-93 (describing Frankfurter's substitute bill
as "a thorough and well-crafted set of hedges against the labor injunction, imposing detailed limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes and
declaring yellow-dog contracts void and unenforceable in federal courts as against public
policy"); Pope, Thirteenth Amendment Versus Commerce Clause, supra note 24, at 40-42
(describing Frankfurter's objections to bill's Thirteenth Amendment theory).
138. See Forbath, supra note 135, at 170, 203-09 (describing southern Democratic
support and demands that, among other things, "the New Deal social provision and labor
standards respect states' rights [and] ... exclude the main categories of southern labor").
139. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 18, at 299.
140. See 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
141. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (concluding that state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants qualifies as state action).
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on addressing private discrimination by upholding the legislation under
the Commerce Clause. 142 Just over a year later, in United States v. Priceand
United States v. Guest, decided the same day, the Court held that a statute
aimed at conspiracies to deprive a person of the exercise of civil rights
was valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation even as applied to private
actors working either indirectly or in concert with a state actor ignorant
of any discriminatory motivation. 43 Although Justice Stewart's majority
opinion in Guest avoided deciding the power to enact the statute under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if it reached purely private action, six members of the Court, over two separate concurring44opinions,
endorsed the view that Congress indeed possessed that power.
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Guest would have been sufficient to ground
a holding in favor of the Joneses on either Commerce Clause or
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The Jones case itself was briefed and
argued exclusively on statutory and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Harry Blackmun, then an Eighth Circuit judge, ruled against the Joneses
but cited numerous cases, including Shelley, the Civil Rights Act of 1964
cases, and Guest, to argue that "the reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases is in
the process of reevaluation, if not overruling, and that a court may not
need to stretch to find state action if appropriate congressional legislation is present.' 45 Looking beyond doctrine, a constitutional ruling
against the Joneses would have called into serious question the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act, which was enacted just days after oral
argument in Jones and whose passage was urged by President Johnson
amid the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. 1 46 As

142. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (finding "[t]he Civil
Rights Act of 1964... plainly appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to
be a national commercial problem"); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 261 (1964) (noting that while "Congress could have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions it found in interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination,"
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "within the power granted [Congress] by the Commerce
Clause").
143. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1966) (finding "the participation
by law enforcement officers... clearly state action"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
756 (1966) (finding "express allegation of state involvement sufficient" at pleading stage).
144. See 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring) (explaining that "there now can be
no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing
all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment
rights"); id. at 774, 777 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
"conspiracy to interfere with the right to equal utilization of state facilities [violates the
statute] without regard to whether state officers participated in the alleged conspiracy").
145. 379 F.2d 33, 42 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 409.
146. The Fair Housing Act, which was based on the Commerce Clause and on
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was broader than § 1982, as it prohibited discrimination on a range of grounds that extended beyond just race and included an enforcement mechanism in cases of private discrimination. Fair Housing Act of 1967:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking &
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Gerhard Casper wrote, "[T]he hot spring of 1968 was not an easy time to
turn down a claim like that of theJoneses."14 v
There is little question, then, that assuming § 1982 applied to private
discrimination in residential housing, the Supreme Court would have
upheld its constitutionality with or without advancing a Thirteenth
Amendment theory. Why, then, did the Court base its decision on the
Thirteenth Amendment? The oral argument in Jones may provide a clue.
The Thirteenth Amendment was invoked just once in either petitioner's
argument or in the argument of the United States as amicus curiae. Its
first and only mention came some twelve minutes into Samuel
Liberman's argument for petitioner, during the following exchange with
Justice Stewart, the author of the Jones majority opinion:
Liberman: In the holdings of this Court in Katzenbach v.
Morgan and United States v. Price and the Guest case
this limiting interpretation of the power of
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 has been abandoned, 148 so that any dictum...
Except that this statute was enacted under the aeStewart:
gis of the Thirteenth Amendment, wasn't it?
Liberman: Originally it was enacted under the Thirteenth
Amendment and reenacted...
Reenacted after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Stewart:
Amendment.
Liberman: That's right.
Its original passage was under the aegis of the
Stewart:
Thirteenth Amendment.
Liberman: Yes. I was referring to the force, if any, of the dictum in Hurd v. Hodge, which I think did perhaps
imply some limitation due to a Fourteenth
Amendment construction which I was urging has
been abandoned since that time by this Court in
the Guest case and the Price case.
But if this were valid legislation under the
Stewart:
Thirteenth Amendment, it escapes me why we
have to worry about the Fourteenth Amendment
and any limitations contained in it.
Currency, 90th Cong. 6-14, 23-24 (1967) (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att'y Gen. of the
United States).
147. Casper, supra note 32, at 132.
148. Liberman is here referring to limitations on Section 5 authority suggested in dictum in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). The Court in Hurd, a companion case to
Shelley, held that the courts of the District of Columbia may not enforce restrictive racial
covenants in real estate transactions. In the course of so holding, however, Chief Justice
Vinson indicated, in dicta, that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "does not invalidate private
restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of those agreements are achieved by the
parties through voluntary adherence to the terms" rather than, for example, by seeking
court intervention against a seller who wishes to contract with a black purchaser. Id. at 31.
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It's our opinion that we don't have to, that we're
really engaged in a question of statutory interpretation.
And the power of Congress under the Thirteenth
Amendment to enact this legislation.
Yes. 149

Liberman:
It appears that Stewart, unique among the Justices, believed both
that § 1982 applied to private housing discrimination and that Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be applied to such discrimination.1 50 A Fourteenth Amendment holding in Jones would likely have garnered six votes, but Justice Stewart's opinion in Jones garnered seven, all
but those of Justices Harlan and White, who dissented on prudential
grounds (because of the recent passage of the Fair Housing Act)15 1and
who expressed deep skepticism about the Court's statutory holding.
The Thirteenth Amendment analysis in Jones, unnecessary either to
the result in Jones or to the subsequent constitutionality of the Fair
Housing Act, has done little importantjudicial work since. The closest we
get is Runyon v. McCrary, which upheld the constitutionality of the contracting section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as applied to racial discrimination in private school admissions, 152 and Griffin v. Breckenidge,
which affirmed congressional power under Section 2 to pass the provision of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act that forbids conspiracies to deprive
persons of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities. 153 Runyon strays at least as far as Jones from the original expected
application of the Thirteenth Amendment but, like Jones, it could easily
149. Oral Argument at 11:22, Jones, 392 U.S. 409 (No. 645), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1967/1967_645#argument-1
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
150. Justices Stewart, Harlan, and White were the only three members of the Guest
Court not to assert that Congress could reach private action via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 774, 782, 782 & n.6 (1966) (Brennan,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that majority "expresses the view
today that § 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with
the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in the conspiracy" but noting "[t]he opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart construes § 241 . . . to require proof of active participation by
state officers.., and ... does not purport to deal with this question"); see also supra note
144 and accompanying text (quoting opinions ofJustice Clark andJustice Brennan).
151. Jones, 392 U.S. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining "the political processes
of our own era have... given birth to a civil rights statute embodying 'fair housing' provisions which would... [provide] the type of relief which the petitioners ... seek").
152. 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (concluding "Section 1981 [of the Civil Rights Act of
1866], as applied to the [private school] conduct at issue here, constitutes an exercise of
federal legislative power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment fully consistent with
Meyer, Pierce, and the cases that followed in their wake").
153. 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) (creating civil cause
of action against individuals who "conspire or go in disguise" for purposes of "depriving.., any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws").

2012]

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT OPTIMISM

1761

have been justified under the Commerce Clause or (but for Jones's
missed opportunity) under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Griffin Court concluded that an earlier construction of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, in Collins v. Hardyman,' that held that it did not apply to private conspiracies was not binding because it was grounded needlessly in
constitutional avoidance. Justice Stewart wrote, "[I] t is clear, in the light
of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that
case was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist." 5 The Thirteenth Amendment holding in
Griffin is far narrower than the holding in Jones (as evidenced by the
Burger Court's unanimity on this point), and there is little reason to believe the former holding required the latter. The facts of Griffin involved
a vicious premeditated assault on a group of black men traveling 1in
56
Mississippi, on the (mistaken) belief that they were civil rights workers;
this, more than private housing discrimination, is a "badge or incident"
of slavery if ever there was one.
Post-Jones, Section 1 claims have continued their nearly unbroken futility streak outside the context of peonage. Thus, in Palmer v. Thompson,
decided one week after Griffin, the Court rejected a Thirteenth
Amendment argument that the city of Jackson, Mississippi, was not permitted to shutter its public swimming pools in response to a desegregation order, saying that the argument "would severely stretch [the
Amendment's] short simple words and do violence to its history."1 57 In
City of Memphis v. Greene, the Court rejected the argument that closing a
street that traversed a white neighborhood to prevent predominantly
black motorists from passing through violated either § 1982 or Section 1
58
of the Thirteenth Amendment.1
But the most frustrating recent decision for those who seek an expansive Thirteenth Amendment might be
United States v. Kozminski, in which the Court interpreted the phrase "involuntary servitude," as used in federal statutes preventing conspiracies
to deprive civil rights, as not contemplating psychological coercion but
' 59
only "the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion."
Kozminski was a statutory case but the Court surveyed its Thirteenth
Amendment cases to reach its decision. Justice O'Connor cited favorably
to the dicta in the 1916 case of Butler v. Perry, which upheld a state law
requiring uncompensated citizen labor on public roads, stating that the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

341 U.S. 651 (1951).
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96.
Id. at 90-92.
403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971).
451 U.S. 100, 129 (1981).
487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).

1762

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112:1733

"general intent" behind the words "involuntary servitude" was "to prohibit conditions 'akin to African slavery."" '
Under the circumstances it is fair to ask whether, from a progressive
perspective, Jones was a mistake. The political process that produced the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act had settled on viable
doctrinal hooks to which the Court had tentatively provided its blessing.
But rather than accept the outcome of that process, the Jones Court
struck out, idiosyncratically, on its own. Jones has virtually no significant
doctrinal progeny and represents a missed opportunity to build upon the
slow erosion of the Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine that, by
1968, was nearly complete.' 61 Dealing in counterfactuals is always perilous, but it seems reasonable to say that, had the Jones Court upheld §
1982 as a valid exercise of Section 5 authority, the Runyon Court might
have relied on the Commerce Clause, thereby complicating the later
anti-progressive holding in United States v. Lopez, 162 and the Morrison Court
would have had to overrule Jones (and perhaps Runyon) to reach its result. A Fourteenth Amendment holding in Jones might also have emboldened Congress to more aggressively test the boundaries of its expanding
authority over private action.
By contrast, the labor movement might have earned a victory, despite itself, in failing to persuade Congress and the Court to rely more
explicitly on the Thirteenth Amendment in passing the NorrisLaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act. Although the decisions in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States163 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co."6 cast
doubt on the viability of the Commerce Clause as a jurisdictional tie to
labor relations, the Court famously reversed course in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.'65 Would the post-Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Court
160. Id. at 942 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
161. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (describing state action doctrine around time Joneswas decided).
162. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1991 "exceeds
the authority of Congress to regulate commerce ... among the several states" (quoting
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
163. 295 U.S. 495, 507 (1935) (finding "minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the [Live Poultry] code ... beyond the purview of the commerce clause").
164. 298 U.S. 238, 252 (1936) (rejecting argument that "the commerce clause was intended to confer upon the Federal Government the power to control the essential economic activities of the States and of the people through a determination of the prices at
which they might sell what they produced").
165. 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (finding "Congress had constitutional authority to safeguard the right of... employees to self-organization and freedom in the choice of representatives for collective bargaining" under Commerce Clause). We can tell a parallel story
about the role of Thirteenth Amendment arguments in the failed Child Labor
Amendment and the Fair Labor Standards Act, which was upheld as valid Commerce
Clause legislation in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941). See Mishra, supra note
4, at 73-107 (explaining circumstances and reasons why Thirteenth Amendment was rejected in anti-child-labor movement).
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have blessed a Thirteenth Amendment-based NLRA? Felix Frankfurter
called Furuseth's Thirteenth Amendment arguments "too silly for any
practical lawyer's use."' 66 It is difficult to imagine that the Roosevelt
Court, packed with like-minded New Deal pragmatists, would have shepherded into being a Labor Constitution protective of social and economic rights in the teeth of the kind of politics that produced the Taft-

Hartley Act in 1947.167
These two examples suggest that the most productive use of
Thirteenth Amendment optimism lies not in encouraging appellate lawyers and judges to incorporate Thirteenth Amendment arguments into
briefing and judicial decisions, but rather in stimulating a political
movement to broaden its imagination and understand its ends in
Thirteenth Amendment terms. The Thirteenth Amendment may be especially useful for this purpose because it may be read to embody a national commitment to social and economic justice. This is its comparative
advantage over competing constitutional rights frames. Its Section 2which on this view is far more important than Section 1 1 -may therefore be read to burden Congress with a constitutional responsibility to
root out pervasive and demeaning inequality and subjugation even in the
absence of local governmental action.' 69 I have argued elsewhere that
progressives are less apt than conservatives to structure their policy demands as constitutional imperatives, and are therefore less successful at
1 70
motivating their base to seek to influence constitutional politics.
Thirteenth Amendment optimism can be a vehicle for doing so and may
166. Pope, Thirteenth Amendment Versus Commerce Clause, supra note 24, at 40
(quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Roger N. Baldwin,
Dir., ACLU (Dec. 9, 1931)).
167. The Act broadened the NLRA's definition of unfair labor practices to include
certain labor-side collective actions, authorized ight-to-work legislation in states, and
permitted the president to authorize anti-labor injunctions under certain circumstances.
See Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-161 (2006).
168. It is telling that, apart from cases involving peonage, quasi-peonage, or literal
servitude, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment has never, standing alone, been applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate any practice. For examples of the Court's treatment of Section 1, see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944) (invalidating Florida law
that made failure to perform service prima facie evidence of fraudulent securing of property on promise to perform); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) (invalidating
Georgia law that bound individuals who received advances on contracts for services to
perform or face penal sanction); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (dismissing
Thirteenth Amendment challenge to forcing work on public highways); United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914) (holding that Alabama's peonage system violated
Thirteenth Amendment).
169. See James Gray Pope, What's Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and
Why Does It Matter?, 71 Md. L. Rev. 189, 194-96 (2011) (arguing "the Thirteenth
Amendment directly commands the government to undertake the project of social transformation").
170. See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 Ohio St. LJ. 1183,
1195-96 (2011) ("The progressive posture, generally, is ... either purely defensive or oriented towards a vision that does not... require constitutional validation.").
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thereby, indirectly, influence the political process in ways that lead to
significant constitutional change. That change need not be grounded
expressly in Thirteenth Amendment language, and indeed, the radical
promise of the Amendment makes that possibility rather unlikely.
III.

THE EXAMPLES RECONSIDERED

Part I provided four examples of Thirteenth Amendment optimism
and argued that, in each case, the arguments advanced were too fanciful
to be accepted by a court, too radical to persuade opponents of the targeted policy outcome, and not needed to persuade policy proponents.
Part II outlined some potential benefits and costs to advancing arguments of this character and suggested that the best way to preserve the
benefits while mitigating the costs was to use Thirteenth Amendment
optimism to motivate politics rather than to influence judicial doctrine
directly. This Part applies the insights of Part II to the examples in Part I.
It should be clear by now that what each case is missing is not an argument-these are in abundance-but a movement fit to integrate arguments into higher law. Thirteenth Amendment optimism will not itself
perform the integrative work, but it may be able to help build the movement.
The right to terminate a pregnancy is, at its core, a negative right; so
long as we are speaking the language of negative rights, Thirteenth
Amendment discourse stands at a comparative disadvantage. It is particularly unhelpful to compare pregnant women to slaves or involuntary
servants if the goal is to reach consensus with political opponents of
abortion rights, whose likely reaction to comparing a fetus to a slave master is horror. The Thirteenth Amendment ends reproductive rights conversations that any viable political process must facilitate. To the extent
that abortion-related rights may be framed in positive terms, there may
be a role for Thirteenth Amendment optimism, but it is bound to be limited for the reasons just discussed. One possibility is in advocacy over access of low-income women to family planning services, which is hampered by state and federal1 laws that channel public funding away from
17
abortion-related services.
171. The Hyde Amendment restricts the use of Medicaid funds for abortion services,
Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (prohibiting federal funds for abortions except in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest), and Title X, which provides
federal funding for family planning services, cannot be used directly to fund abortions, 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2006). Other indirect limitations on funding of abortions frequently occur, ad hoc, through the appropriations process. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Empowering Private Protection of Conscience, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 101, 109 n.43 (2010)
(discussing appropriations riders that prohibit funding of government entities that discriminate against health care providers who refuse to provide abortions). Moreover, the
recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes a number of provisions designed to prevent indirect public funding of abortions. See James Comstock & Sloane
Kuney Rosenthal, Health Care Access: Access After Health Care Reform, 12 Geo. J.
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The other three examples from Part I-child abuse, hate speech,
and domestic violence-differ from abortion rights in that they involve
positive rights to state protection from private aggressors who, unlike fetuses, are not likely to be viewed with sympathy by anyone within the constitutional conversation. For child abuse and domestic violence, the objection to constitutionalized rights for victims of these acts is largely
grounded in federalism rather than solicitude for the competing rights
of other private actors.1 v2 For hate speech, the objection is indeed
grounded in competing constitutional rights, but they are those of an
unpopular rights bearer. The Thirteenth Amendment may therefore
serve as a somewhat more promising political frame for these issues than
for abortion rights.
There is no reason, in principle, why Thirteenth Amendment analysis cannot inform the hate speech debate in ways that can influence the
politics surrounding the issue. Previous efforts to integrate Fourteenth
Amendment analysis into the constitutional conversation over hate
speech have suffered from the familiar problem of characterizing private
actions as state-sanctioned. 173 The Thirteenth Amendment suggests an
affirmative right on the part of African-Americans, at a minimum, to be
free from the race-based intimidation characteristic of the antebellum
South, even if that intimidation is accomplished (as it often was then)
through speech. The difficulty, as ever, is in defining both the class of
persons who may benefit from a Thirteenth Amendment analysis and the
class who may be disadvantaged by it. In a rapidly diversifying nation, is it
either appropriate or politically feasible to limit hate speech legislation
to previously enslaved groups like blacks or, arguably, women? Historically, among the biggest opponents of hate speech legislation have been
civil rights groups for whom incautious language is necessary to get their
point across. 174 Would Thirteenth Amendment-based hate speech legislation be asymmetrical as to race? 75 Not if it wants to pass Congress.

Gender & L. 667, 675-76 (2011) (explaining "[n]o federal funds may used [sic] to pay for
abortions beyond those permitted by the Hyde Amendments" and other guarantees on
abortion). Only seventeen states permit the use of state funds for all or most medically
necessary abortions. See State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, Guttmacher Inst.
(Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/spibSFAM.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
172. See Siegel, supra note 95, Rule of Love, at 2197 (explaining "critics [of Violence
Against Women Act] argued that creating a federal cause of action to vindicate such injuries usurped a traditional regulatory interest of the states").
173. See Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at 157 n.181 (noting "the Equal
Protection Clause creates monumental state action hurdles" for anti-hate-speech position).
174. See generally Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American
Controversy 2 (1994) (explaining "strong tradition of free speech resulted from a series of
choices ... by advocacy groups").
175. Amar raises this possibility. See Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 3, at
159-60 (noting "the Thirteenth Amendment approach raises an interesting possibility not
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The federal hate crimes law passed in 1969 reaches beyond race, to
religion and national origin, and the amendment to that law passed explicitly on Thirteenth Amendment grounds-the Matthew Shepard
Act-covers hate crimes based on gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, and disability. 176 The original bill applied to hate crimes that
interfered with federally protected activities, but the amendment eliminated that jurisdictional requirement. It is not obvious that the amendment could have been passed without Thirteenth Amendment optimism,
but it would be surprising indeed if it were to be upheld as applied to
crimes against gays or transgendered people on Thirteenth Amendment
grounds. The political environment in which that holding is plausible
has no need for Thirteenth Amendment optimism, but the legislative
mobilization that created the Act may well have required it.
Among the most resourceful and promising uses of Thirteenth
Amendment optimism was, as described, in contemplation of VAWA. In
his testimony, Neuborne offered a Thirteenth Amendment framework
that, among others, could justify a political intervention on behalf of victims of gender-motivated violence. 177 A Thirteenth Amendment argument situates VAWA or its equivalent not just as constitutionally permitted-proponents needed no such persuasion-but as constitutionally
mandated, in order to combat ineffectual, modern state based remedies
for acts that were historically shielded by state laws maintained to preserve a master-servant spousal relationship. VAWA passed Congress with
bipartisan support and, although the civil redress component was defeated in Morrison,178 the broader Act, which funds support services and
easily visible through a conventional First Amendment lens: openly asymmetrical regulation of racial hate speech may be less, rather than more, constitutionally troubling").
176. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
111-84 div. E, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.).
177. See supra notes 97, 103-104 and accompanying text (describing testimony).
178. It might be argued, then, that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the
scope of congressional enforcement provisions undermines the argument that the best
outlet for Thirteenth Amendment optimism runs through Section 2. The dichotomy this
Essay suggests between the relative narrowness of Section 1 and the relative generativity of
Section 2 may be one that the Court refuses to appreciate. But even apart from the unsettled application of City of Boerne v. Flores to the Thirteenth Amendment, see Jennifer
Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress's Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power
After City ofBoerne v. flores, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 77, 82 (2010) (explaining "the proper
scope of Congress' Section 2 enforcement power ... by considering how the structural
concerns that motivated the Court in City of Boerne might play out in the Section 2 context"); Sager, supra note 16, at 152 (exploring whether Jones can be explained "as an exercise of Congress's remedial authority as that authority is understood in Boernd'), I do not
view lores and its progeny as a significant hindrance to this Essay's claims for two reasons.
First, the Essay's chief claim, again, is not that legislation should formally be premised on
the Thirteenth Amendment or that judges will or should revitalize Section 2 jurisprudence; it is rather that such argument can provide a constitutional frame to claims involving positive rights, and thereby invigorate legislative advocacy. The jurisdictional hooks, or
lack thereof, that motivate members of Congress do not constrain either federal judges or
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provides training programs to benefit victims of gender-related violence,
remained in place until 2011.179
We might imagine a parallel effort in support of a "Violence Against
Children Act," on behalf of victims of child abuse. Child welfare and
safety is a frequent topic of federal legislative proposals, but it is uncommon for such proposals to address domestic violence as such against
children. For example, Senator Barbara Boxer of California has twice
introduced a bill with the precise title just proposed. 80 The Violence
Against Children Act would provide federal funding to investigate, prosecute, and prevent crimes involving children.' 81 At this level of generality,
it is difficult to justify such an act under the Thirteenth Amendment; the
argument that violence against children generally reflects the lingering
effects of a slavery regime is not credible. The politics of this effort are
therefore more difficult than for VAWA. Many of the arguments once
used to resist laws against spousal abuse-for example, that they intrude
upon the sovereignty of the man over his family affairs-have analogs in
the debate over child abuse. Corporal punishment of children remains
popular, indeed immune from Eighth Amendment scrutiny, 182 and even
child-victim advocates concede the need for a residuum of parental control over child discipline and socialization.'l 8 Still, VAWA points the way

the Office of the Solicitor General. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316
(1819) (upholding constitutionality of Bank of the United States without reference to any
jurisdictional bases mentioned in statute of incorporation). But see Florida v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1313-20 (lth Cir. 2011) (relying on text and
legislative history to determine whether Affordable Care Act's minimum coverage provision is "tax" or "penalty"), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). Indeed, some of the legislative proposals that Thirteenth
Amendment optimism can motivate, such as a relaxation on Title X funding restrictions,
require no constitutional justification. Second, even if Thirteenth Amendment Section 2
arguments lose in federal court, a fight that situates progressives as adhering to the will of
the people in the face of an "activist" Supreme Court is one that progressives should, relatively speaking, be willing to have.
179. As of this writing, the Senate and the House of Representatives have passed competing reauthorization bills. See Robert Pear, House Vote Sets Up Battle on Domestic
Violence Bill, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2012, at A19 (describing House's vote on Republicansponsored VAWA reauthorization bill).
180. See Press Release, Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator, Boxer Reintroduces Violence
Against Children Act (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/
en/press/releases/093010b.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
181. See Violence Against Children Act of 2010, S. 3899, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 201.
182. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977) (holding "[t]he Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is inapplicable to school
paddlings"); see Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 575,
576-77 (2003) (reporting that ninety percent of American parents-more than in any
other industrialized nation-use some form of corporal punishment).
183. See Lisa A. Fontes & Margarita R. O'Neill-Arana, Assessing for Child
Maltreatment in Culturally Diverse Families, in Handbook of Multicultural Assessment:
Clinical, Psychological, and Educational Applications 627, 647-48 (Lisa A. Suzuki &
Joseph G. Ponterotto eds., 3d ed. 2008).
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forward in the use of Thirteenth Amendment arguments in this domain;
the Thirteenth Amendment can emphasize that, whatever the ultimate
structure of a regulatory response to child abuse, legislative silence is not
an option.
CONCLUSION

The Thirteenth Amendment is unusual in several ways that make it a
popular location for creative constitutional argument. Virtually unique
among the Constitution's rights-conferring provisions, it lacks a state action requirement. Its bold prohibition on the "existence" of slavery burdens both states and the federal government with a responsibility to
prosecute certain affronts to personal freedom. It nominally remains the
case, moreover, that the Supreme Court's decisional law grants Congress
broad authority to eliminate the "badges and incidents" of slavery. Whatever such badges and incidents include, Jones makes clear that they are
not nearly exhausted by practices that approximate chattel slavery.
As Daniel Farber writes, however, "there is something inherently
suspect about an interpretation so clever that it never would have occurred to the speaker or the audience."1 8 4 This, in a nutshell, is the difficulty with Thirteenth Amendment optimism. Whatever original meaning
originalism means in theory, it does not easily justify an interpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment that is inconsistent with how everyone at the
time, and indeed the vast majority of people today, would have expected
it to apply. Thirteenth Amendment optimism is, largely for this reason,
unlikely to persuade skeptics or to infiltrate judicial doctrine as such.
Still, there may be limited ways to put the unique features of the
Amendment to work for Thirteenth Amendment optimists. The capacity
of the Thirteenth Amendment to constitutionalize affirmative rights may
lend constitutional heft to what would otherwise be policy arguments and
may thereby motivate advocates to push legislation inspired (if not ultimately justified) by the Amendment's special, perhaps too special, promise.

184. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 917, 927 (1986).

